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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Ensminger pied guilty to one count of felony violation
He received a unified
Mr. Ensminger

a no contact order.

of five years, with two and one-half

fixed.

that the no contact order included on the judgment of conviction

fails to meet with almost every requirement contained within Idaho Criminal Rule 46.2
and, therefore,

this Court to vacate the no contact order entered by the district

court as part of the judgment of conviction.

Mr. Ensminger also contends that his

sentence represents an abuse of the district court's discretion, as it is excessive given
any view of the facts.

Statement of the Facts & Course of Proceedings
Between September 12 and 28, 2013, Mr. Ensminger attempted to contact his
ex-wife by telephone 74 times while he was in jail. 1 (Presentence Investigation Report

(hereinafter, PSl), 2 pp.2-3.) At the time of the contact and attempted contact, there
were several no contact orders in place between Mr. Ensminger and his ex-wife. (PSI,
p.3.)
As Mr. Ensminger had been convicted of two other no contact order violations in
the past five years, he was charged by information with three counts of felony violation
of a no contact order. (R., pp.43-45.) Pursuant to a plea agreement, Mr. Ensminger
pied guilty to one count of felony violation of a no contact order. (4/21/14 Tr., p.26, L.3

1

These were not hostile phone calls-each call began with either Mr. Ensminger or his
ex-wife using a term of endearment such as "Hon" or "Dear." (PSI, p.56.) In fact,
Mr. Ensminger's ex-wife advised law enforcement that she wanted Mr. Ensminger to
stop calling only because she could not afford to keep accepting the collect calls. (PSI,
p.56.)

1

- p.27, L.1; R., pp.47-51.)

Pursuant to the terms of the plea agreement, the State

agreed to dismiss the remaining two counts, not to file a persistent violator sentencing
enhancement, not to file additional charge in police reports numbers 13-3769 and 146667, and to recommend a sentence of five years, with three years fixed, concurrent
with Mr. Ensminger's Ada County case. 3 (4/21/14 Tr., p.6, L.6 - p.8, L.16; R., p.52.)
The district court accepted Mr. Ensminger's guilty plea and ordered a PSI.

(4/21/14

Tr., p.26, L.15 - p.27, L.21; R., p.52.)
At the sentencing hearing on June 2, 2014, the State recommended a sentence
of five years, with three years fixed. (6/2/14 Tr., p.35, Ls.1-4.) Mr. Ensminger's counsel
recommended a unified sentence of two years, with one year fixed. (6/2/14 Tr., p.42,
Ls.23-25.) The district court sentenced Mr. Ensminger to five years, with two and onehalf years fixed, and ordered that the time be served concurrently with the sentence for
Mr. Ensminger's other conviction. (6/2/14 Tr., p.65, Ls.10-16; R., pp.57-60.)
At his sentencing hearing, Mr. Ensminger asked the district court to remove or
modify the no contact order the State asked to be entered against him.

(6/2/14

Tr., p.38, Ls.25.) The district court denied the motion and entered a new no contact
order prohibiting Mr. Ensminger from having contact with Mr. Ensminger's ex-wife,
Leann Mayden, for five years. (6/2/14 Tr., p.39, L.16 - p.40, L.4; R., p.55.) However,
the written judgment of conviction also contained a no contact order provision which
utilized the language "shall have no contact, directly or indirectly, with the victim, Leann
Mayden" but reflected no expiration date. (6/2/14 Tr., p.4, Ls.3-4; R., p.58.)

2

The designation PSI shall refer to the electronic file containing the PSI and all
documents attached to the PSI.
3 Mr. Ensminger had been sentenced to five years, with two years fixed, in Ada County
case number 2013-10290, in which he was convicted of a felony no contact order
violation. (6/2/14 Tr., p.36, Ls.8-10, p.43, Ls.4-8, 65, Ls.12-13.)

2

On June 6, 2014, Mr. Ensminger appealed from the judgment of conviction.
(R., pp.62-64.)

3

ISSUES
1.

Diel the district court err when it entered a no contact order in the judgment of
conviction that is invalid due to a lack of any discernible date of expiration and
fails to conform to the requirements of I.C.R. 46.2?

2.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it sentenced Mr. Ensminger to a
unified sentence of five years, with two and one-half years fixed, following his
plea of guilty to felony violation of a no contact order?

4

ARGUMENT
I.
The District Court Erred When It Entered A No Contact Order Within The Judgment Of
Conviction As It Is Invalid Because It Contains No Discernible Date Of Expiration And
Fails To Conform With The Requirements Of I.C.R. 46.2
At sentencing, over Mr. Ensminger's objection, the district court

a no

contact order against Mr. Ensminger that continues to be in force. (R., p.55.) At the
time, Mr. Ensminger objected to the entry of a no contact order and moved the court to
either remove or to modify the no contact order so that he would be able to have written
contact with his ex-wife. (6/2/14 Tr., p.38,L.16 - p.39, L.5.) Although the district court
noted that the ex-wife wished to have contact with Mr. Ensminger, and the

did not

object to written communications, the district court nonetheless found the relationship to
be "unhealthy" and put in place a five year no contact order which prohibited contact of
any kind between the two parties. (6/2/14 Tr., p.38, Ls.1-15, p.39, Ls.6-13, p.39, L.21
p.40, L.4; R., p.55.) On appeal, Mr. Ensminger does not challenge this properly entered
no contact order.

However, in addition to entering a no contact order on the Ada

County form (R., p.55), the district court also included a proviso on the judgment of
conviction that prohibited Mr. Ensminger from having contact with his ex-wife,
(R., p.58.) This proviso contained no end date and otherwise did not comply with the
requirements of I.C.R. 46.2 and I.C. § 18-920. (R., p.58.) Mr. Ensminger contends that
the no contact order proviso contained within the judgment of conviction is invalid
because it fails to contain a date of expiration, and fails to comport with the
requirements of I.C.R. 46.2.
This Court exercises free review over the question of whether a criminal no
contact order is entered in compliance with relevant statutes and court rules. State v.
5

Castro, 145 Idaho 173, 175 (2008). Criminal no contact orders are authorized under
I.C. § 18-920, which permits the district court to enter a no contact order when a
defendant is charged with, or convicted of, a list of enumerated offenses, or for "any
other offense for which a court finds that a no contact order is appropriate." I.C. § 18920(1 ).

This statute makes it a criminal offense to violate such a no contact order.

I.C. § 18-920. The specific minimum requirements for issuance of such an order are
enumerated in I.C.R. 46.2 which provides, in pertinent part, that:
(a) No contact orders issued pursuant to Idaho Code § 18-920 shall be in
writing and served on or signed by the defendant. Each judicial district
shall adopt by administrative order a form for no contact orders for that
district. No contact orders must contain, at a minimum, the
following information:

Cl)

The case number, defendant's name and victim's name;

(2)

A distance restriction;

(3)

That the order will expire at 11 :59 p.m. on a specific date, or
upon dismissal of the case;

(4)

An advisory that:
(a)

A violation of the order may be prosecuted as a
separate crime under I.C. § 18-920 for which no bail
will be set until an appearance before a judge, and
the possible penalties for this crime,

(b)

The no contact order can only be modified by a judge,
and

(c)

When more than one domestic violence protection
order is in place, the most restrictive provision will
control any conflicting terms of any other civil or
criminal protection order.

I.C.R. 46.2(a) (emphasis added).
Virtually none of the advisories that are mandated for a valid no contact order
under I.C.R. 46.2 are found in the no contact order that was entered by the district court

6

in the judgment of conviction.

This order was set forth in its entirety within

Mr. Ensminger's judgment of conviction and provided:

'The defendant shall have no

contact, directly or indirectly, with the victim, Leann Mayden." (R., p.58.)
This order was not on a separate form as required by I.C.R. 46.2(a). The order
contains no distance restriction whatsoever. See I.C.R. 46.2{a)(2). The order does not
contain a date of termination. See I.C.R. 46.2(a)(3); see also Castro, 145 Idaho at 175
(holding that the amendment of I.C.R. 46.2 to require inclusion of a date of termination
was necessary as it was contrary to public policy to permit criminal no contact orders to
remain in "enshrined perpetuity"). There is no advisory in this order at all regarding any
of the potential criminal penalties that may be imposed - as a separate criminal offense
- for a violation of this order; that the order could only be modified by a judge; or that, if
another no contact order or domestic violence protection order is in place, that the more
restrictive provisions would control what contacts are permitted. See I.C.R. 46.2(a)(4 ).
Each of the required provisions and advisories for a valid no contact order under
I.C.R. 46.2(a) are either deficient, or entirely absent from, the no contact order entered
as part of the judgment in this case.

These requirements are not merely procedural

formalities that have little bearing on the overall validity of a criminal no contact order.
The requisite information is essential in order to comport with due process requirements
as to notice to those impacted by such a no contact order.
Due process requires that the charged individual have prior notice of the nocontact order before criminal liability can be imposed on the basis of an alleged violation
of that order's terms. "It is well established that a conviction under a criminal enactment
which does not give adequate notice that the conduct charged is prohibited is violative
of due process." Wright v. Georgia, 373 U.S. 284, 293 (1963). In fact, even when the
7

regulation at issue is a prison rule, as opposed to a criminal statute, due process
requires fair notice that the conduct at issue is prohibited before a sanction can be
imposed. See, e.g., Nelson v. Hayden, 138 Idaho 619,622 (Ct. App. 2003).
Regarding penal laws of general applicability, satisfying the notice requirement
demanded by due process is fairly straightforward - the statute itself that defines a
criminal offense is generally deemed to put the public on notice as to what conduct may
or may not subject them to criminal punishment. See, e.g., Wilson v. State, 133 Idaho
87 4, 880 (Ct. App. 2000).

As was noted by the Wilson Court, "it is axiomatic that

citizens are presumptively charged with knowledge of the law once such laws are
passed." Id.
But no-contact orders that are entered solely against a particular individual are
different. Unlike criminal statutes, which define criminal offenses generally and apply to
all those subject to the laws of Idaho, criminal no-contact orders are issued solely
against one individual and are frequently directed at contacts that would be entirely
legal in absence of the individualized order. See I.C. § 18-920. In addition, no person
may be arrested for the offense of violation of a no-contact order without a warrant
unless there is probable cause to believe both that the person has violated the nocontact order and that the person had prior notice of the order. I.C. § 18-920(4 ).
In sum, the district court's no contact order entered as part of the judgment in this
case fails to meet with virtually every mandatory requirement for criminal no contact
orders set forth in I.C.R. 46.2(a).

However, this Court treats the provisions of a

sentence relating to criminal no contact orders as severable from the remaining
sentence. See State v. Jeppesen, 138 Idaho 71, 75 (2002). Accordingly, where the no
contact order is invalid, this Court will vacate the no contact order as a severable
8

provision from the underlying judgment of conviction and sentence. Id. Mr. Ensminger
therefore asks that this Court vacate the no contact order entered by the district court as
part of the judgment of conviction and remand this case for entry of an amended
judgment of conviction omitting all no contact provisos.

11.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Sentenced Mr. Ensminger To A
Unified Sentence Of Five Years, With Two And One-Half Years Fixed, Following His
Plea Of Guilty To Felony Violation Of A No Contact Order
Mr. Ensminger asserts that, given any view of the facts, his unified sentence of
five years, with two and one-half years fixed, is excessive.

Where a defendant

contends that the sentencing court imposed an excessively harsh sentence, the
appellate court will conduct an independent review of the record giving consideration to
the nature of the offense, the character of the offender, and the protection of the public
interest. See State v. Reinke, 103 Idaho 771 (Ct. App. 1982).
The Idaho Supreme Court has held that, "'[w]here a sentence is within statutory
limits, an appellant has the burden of showing a clear abuse of discretion on the part of
the court imposing the sentence."'

State v. Jackson, 130 Idaho 293, 294 (1997)

(quoting State v. Cotton, 100 Idaho 573, 577 (1979)). Mr. Ensminger does not allege
that his sentence exceeds the statutory maximum.

Accordingly, in order to show an

abuse of discretion, Mr. Ensminger must show that in light of the governing criteria, the
sentence was excessive considering any view of the facts. Id. The governing criteria or
objectives of criminal punishment are: (1) protection of society; (2) deterrence of the
individual and the public generally; (3) the possibility of rehabilitation; and (4)
punishment or retribution for wrongdoing. Id.

9

In light of Mr. Ensminger's rehabilitative potential, the district court abused its
discretion in sentencing him excessively. The district court failed to consider the fact
that Mr. Ensminger had support in the community (should the no contact order be lifted
or modified) and that, with programming, Mr. Ensminger could likely be successful in the
community. (PSI, pp.252-53.)
Mr. Ensminger has strong support from family members and friends.

See

State v. Shideler, 103 Idaho 593, 594-595 ( 1982) (reducing sentence of defendant who

had the support of his family and employer in his rehabilitation efforts). Mr. Ensminger's
ex-wife wrote a supportive letter to the district court which advised that she was not
afraid of Mr. Ensminger and in which she advocated treatment for Mr. Ensminger, not
prison time. (PSI, pp.252-53.) Further, Mr. Ensminger desperately wants to be able to
help his adult daughter and her young son.

Mr. Ensminger told the district court at

sentencing that the main reason he was trying to contact his ex-wife in violation of the
no contact order(s) was to try to find his grandson, whom Mr. Ensminger believed his
daughter was in the process of giving up for adoption. (6/2/14 Tr., p.46, L.24 - p.47,
L.1, p.60, Ls.12-14; PSI, p.13.)
The Idaho Supreme Court has recognized that Idaho Code § 19-2523 requires
the trial court to consider a defendant's mental illness as a sentencing factor. Hollon v.
State, 132 Idaho 573, 581 (1999). Mr. Ensminger reported a history of mental illness,

specifically, Bipolar Disorder. (PSI, p.14.) Mr. Ensminger believes an evaluation and
treatment may be helpful to him; however, no evaluation was ordered by the district
court. (PSI, pp.17-18.) Mr. Ensminger was diagnosed with bipolar disorder while at the
Idaho Department of Correction in 2007. (PSI, p.15.) As a result of the bipolar disorder,
Mr. Ensminger experiences depression and mood swings. (PSI, p.15.)
10

Mr. Ensminger

also has epilepsy, which caused a severe strain on his family when he was younger.
(PSI, pp.11-12, 14.)

He is taking medication to manage both the epilepsy and his

bipolar disorder. (PSI, pp.14-15.)
Further, Mr. Ensminger expressed remorse for his acts. Mr. Ensminger told the
PSI investigator that he felt bad about committing the crime.

(PSI, p.4.)

Idaho

recognizes that some leniency is required when a defendant expresses remorse for his
conduct and accepts responsibility for his acts. State v. Shideler, 103 Idaho 593, 595
(1982); State v. Alberts, 121 Idaho 204,209 (Ct. App. 1991).
Based upon the above mitigating factors, Mr. Ensminger asserts that the district
court abused its discretion by imposing an excessive sentence upon him. He asserts
that had the district court properly considered his mental health condition and remorse,
it would have imposed a less severe sentence.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Ensminger respectfully requests that this Court vacate the judgment of
conviction containing the no contact provision. Mr. Ensminger also requests that this
Court reduce his sentence as it deems appropriate. Alternatively, he requests that his
case be remanded to the district court for a new sentencing hearing.
DATED this 26 th day of December, 2014.
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